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Operational Resilience in Healthcare: Examining Incident Response in Fiction and Reality

Recent parallels between fictional media and real-world security incidents highlight critical challenges in healthcare continuity. Industry experts analyze the operational impact of ransomware and the necessity of sturdy downtime procedures to protect patient safety.

Triage Security Media Team
4 min read

A recent coincidence involving HBO’s drama series The Pitt and a security incident at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) has brought the fragility of healthcare operations into focus. While one scenario was scripted and the other real, both events highlight the profound reliance of modern medicine on digital infrastructure and the necessity of effective business continuity planning.

On February 19, The Pitt aired a storyline depicting a trauma center facing a security threat, leading the fictional CEO to preemptively disconnect all IT systems. That same morning, UMMC experienced a ransomware event that impacted its IT environment, including its Epic electronic medical records platform. Consequently, the medical center paused operations across its network of 35 clinics to contain the issue and prevent further disruption.

Evaluating the Realism of Downtime Operations

The fictional depiction in The Pitt explored the immediate operational consequences of a network isolation event. In the episode, staff reverted to manual workflows, relying on paper, pens, and fax machines to maintain patient care.

Mick Coady, field Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of Elisity, notes that the show accurately captured the friction of analog redundancies. "This episode follows the patient care continuum including intake and discharge and shows every point where it breaks: dry-erase boards, triplicate paper orders, a pharmacist manually unlocking medication cabinets one at a time," Coady observes. He suggests this visualizes the exact scenario Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) attempt to convey to their boards—focusing not on the technical nuances of the malware, but on the tangible impact on patient throughput.

Coady highlighted a specific, authentic detail: the necessity of using ballpoint pens because felt-tip ink does not transfer through triplicate carbon copies. "Someone in that writers room has been through a real downtime event. That's an operational detail you only know if you've actually run paper processes in a clinical environment," he says.

Ross Filipek, CISO at Corsica Technologies, agrees that the depiction of operational friction aligns with reality. "What rang true to me was the operational chaos once systems went dark," Filipek says. "Healthcare really is that dependent on IT. When digital charting, tracking boards, and core systems disappear, efficiency drops fast, and risk creeps in."

Analyzing Incident Response Protocols

While the general atmosphere of disruption was accurate, experts pointed out significant deviations from standard incident response procedures in the fictionalized account.

Filipek challenges the plausibility of a CEO unilaterally ordering a full IT shutdown without extensive consultation. In a live environment, such a decision involves a complex risk assessment regarding patient safety. "In a real hospital, executives would be heavily weighing patient safety and operational continuity alongside cyber-risk," he explains. "That decision wouldn't happen without heavy input from IT and security leadership... You don't just pull the plug and hope 24 hours fixes it."

Furthermore, Coady notes that the recovery timeline was compressed for dramatic effect. In actual ransomware events, full system restoration is rarely a matter of days. "Some systems take months to fully restore," Coady says. "If the show makes that look like one bad shift, it undersells what six weeks on paper actually does to a hospital's staff, its patients, and its finances."

Additionally, Coady pointed out that critical medical devices, such as patient monitors, are often segmented or capable of functioning independently of the main network, meaning a total blackout of monitoring equipment is less likely than depicted.

Strategies for Enhancing Resilience

The real-world recovery at UMMC highlights the difficulty of returning to normal operations. As of February 25, the organization reported progress but continued to face challenges, with elective procedures and appointments rescheduled.

Ryan Witt, Vice President of Industry Solutions at Proofpoint, emphasizes that these disruptions are a patient safety concern. Citing data that 70% of affected healthcare facilities report disruptions to patient care, Witt notes, "The most concerning trend [in healthcare] isn't just the volume of attacks, but how disruptive they have become."

To strengthen defenses and minimize impact, Witt recommends focusing on three primary areas:

1. Securing Access and Credentials

Credential compromise remains a primary vector for unauthorized access. Strengthening identity management—specifically through the rigorous application of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)—is a foundational step in preventing threat actors from entering the environment.

2. Establishing Clinical Resilience

Recovery of IT systems is only one part of the equation. Organizations must have practical, tested downtime plans that ensure safe patient care while digital tools are unavailable. Witt advises that these plans must specifically address medication management, lab communications, triage, and patient prioritization.

3. Validating Plans Through Simulation

Resilience cannot be theoretical. Witt advises that leadership teams engage in tabletop exercises and downtime drills that simulate real clinical stress. "Leadership teams should practice making difficult real-time decisions about diversion, communications, and patient prioritization before they have to do it in a real crisis," he says.

There is a positive shift occurring in the industry. Hospital executives and boards are increasingly viewing security not merely as an IT issue, but as a critical component of patient safety. "Boards are starting to ask how an incident could affect patient care, not only how fast systems can be restored," says Witt. "That shift in mindset is important and, frankly, long overdue."

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